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Executive summary
This paper uses panel data on household consumption and income to evaluate the degree of
insurance to income shocks. Our aim is to describe the transmission of income inequality into
consumption inequality. Our framework nests the special cases of self-insurance and the complete
markets assumption. We assess the degree of insurance over and above self-insurance through
savings by contrasting shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of income growth with shifts in the
cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth, and analyzing the way these two measures of
household welfare correlate over time. We combine panel data on income from the PSID with
consumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections in a structural way, i.e. using conventional
demand analysis rather than reduced form imputation procedures. Our results point to some partial
insurance but reject the complete markets restriction. We ﬁnd a greater degree of insurance for
transitory shocks and diﬀerences in the degree of insurance over time and across education. We
also document the importance of durables and of taxes and transfers as a means of insurance.
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11 Introduction
Under complete markets agents can sign contingent contracts providing full insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks to income. Moral hazard and asymmetric information, however, make these
contracts hard to implement, and in fact they are rarely observed in reality. Even a cursory look
at consumption and income data reveals the weakness of the complete markets hypothesis. Thus
volatility of individual consumption is much higher than the volatility of aggregate consumption,
a fact against full insurance (Aiyagari, 1994). Moreover, there is a substantial amount of mobility
in consumption (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2001). Indeed, the growth in consumption inequality over
the 1980s is used in Blundell and Preston (1998) to identify growth in permanent (uninsured)
income inequality over this period in the UK. Formal tests of the complete markets hypothesis (see
Attanasio and Davis, 1996), ﬁnd that the null hypothesis of full consumption insurance is soundly
rejected.1 Attempts to salvage the theory by allowing for risk sharing within the family and no
risk sharing among unrelated families have also failed (Hayashi et al., 1996). At least for developed
economies, full risk sharing seems to be convincingly rejected.
Reﬂecting this evidence, the modern theory of intertemporal consumption behavior is developed
and tested under the assumption of incomplete markets (Hall, 1978). In the permanent income hy-
pothesis, for instance, the only mechanism available to agents to smooth income shocks is personal
savings. In the extreme formulation of this model contracts or other formal or informal arrange-
ments are absent altogether and quadratic preferences are assumed; permanent shocks to income
are permanent shocks to consumption.2
Models that feature a myriad of markets and those that allow for just personal savings as
a smoothing mechanism are clearly extreme characterization of individual behavior and of the
economic environment faced by the consumers. Deaton and Paxson (1994) notice this and envision
“the construction and testing of market models under partial insurance”, while Hayashi et al.
(1996) call for future research to be “directed to estimating the extent of consumption insurance
over and above self-insurance”.
1Notable exceptions are Altug and Miller (1990) and Mace (1991). In these papers, however, failure to reject the
null hypothesis of full consumption insurance is likely to be due to econometric and sample selection issues. See, e.g.,
Nelson (1994).
2Even with precautionary saving, permanent shocks to labour income will typically be almost fully transmitted
into consumption (see below).
1In this paper we address the issue of whether partial consumption insurance is available to
agents and estimate the degree of insurance over and above self-insurance through savings. We
do this by contrasting shifts in the distribution of income growth with shifts in the distribution
of consumption growth, and analyze the way these two measures of household welfare correlate
over time. Our research is related to other papers in the literature, particularly Hall and Mishkin
(1982), Altonji et al. (2002), Deaton and Paxson (1994), and Blundell and Preston (1998).
We document a number of key ﬁndings. Using data from a combination of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumers Expenditure Survey (CEX), we ﬁnd a strong growth
in both permanent and transitory income shocks during the early 1980s. The variance of permanent
shocks thereafter levels oﬀ. There is strong evidence against full insurance for permanent income
shocks but not for transitory income shocks, except for the low income subsample where transitory
shocks seem less insurable. Further there is evidence of partial insurance of permanent income
shocks; the results point to much of this partial insurance occurring through the adjustment of
durable expenditures. Finally we show that taxes and transfers provide an important insurance
mechanism for permanent income shocks.
We use the term partial insurance to denote smoothing devices other than credit markets for
borrowing and saving. There is scattered evidence on the role played by such devices on household
consumption. Theoretical and empirical research have analyzed the role of extended family net-
works (Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak, 1981; Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000), added worker eﬀects (Lundberg,
1985), the timing of durable purchases (Browning and Crossley, 2001a), progressive income taxa-
tion (Mankiw and Kimball, 1992), personal bankruptcy laws (Fay et al., 2002), insurance within
the ﬁrm (Guiso et al., 2002), ﬁnancial markets (Davis and Willen, 2001), and the role of govern-
ment public policy programs, such as unemployment insurance schemes (Engen and Gruber, 2001;
Browning and Crossley, 2001b), Medicaid (Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999), and food stamps (Blundell
and Pistaferri, 2002).
While we do not take a precise stand on the mechanisms (other than savings) that are available
to smooth idiosyncratic shocks to income, we emphasize that our evidence can be used to uncover
whether some of these mechanisms are actually at work, how important they are quantitatively,
and how they diﬀer across households and over time. Our approach is justiﬁed by the fact that
2“although it is possible to examine the mechanisms [providing partial insurance against income
shocks], their multiplicity makes it attractive to look directly at the magnitude that is supposed to
be smoothed, namely consumption” (Deaton, 1995).
In the literature to date no structural model has been estimated to address the issue of partial
insurance directly. Yet, uncovering partial insurance mechanisms is likely to matter for a number of
reasons. First, the presence of mechanisms that allow households to smooth idiosyncratic shocks has
a bearing on aggregation results (see Blundell and Stoker, 2002). Second, it may help to understand
the characteristics of the economic environment faced by the agents. This may prove crucial when
evaluating the performance of macroeconomic models, especially those that explicitly account for
agents’ heterogeneity. Moreover, it is important to understand to what extent changes in welfare
systems aﬀect smoothing abilities, and the consequences of this for private saving behavior. This
is important as far as the eﬃcient design of welfare policy is concerned. Finally, the evaluation
of changes in welfare requires knowledge of the extent of smoothing or insurance available to
consumers. This is particularly relevant in the US, where quantitatively large changes in the
structure of relative prices (most notably, wages) have occurred over the last three decades. Much
research exists about the rise in wage inequality, and we shall have very little to add about this.
Less evidence exists on consumption inequality (Cutler and Katz, 1992; Dynarski and Gruber,
1997). We show that consumption inequality follows very closely the trends in permanent wage
inequality documented, among others, by Moﬃtt and Gottschalk (1994).
A study of this kind requires in principle good quality longitudinal data on household con-
sumption and income. It is well known that the PSID contains longitudinal income data but the
information on consumption is scanty (limited to food and few more items). Our strategy is to
impute non-durable consumption to all PSID households combining PSID data with consumption
data from repeated CEX cross-sections in a structural way. Previous studies (Skinner, 1987) impute
non-durable consumption data in the PSID using CEX regressions of non durable consumption on
consumption items (food, housing, utilities) and demographics available in both the PSID and the
CEX. These equations do not correspond to what is studied in demand analyses. In contrast, our
approach starts from a standard demand function for food at home (a consumption item avail-
able in both surveys); we make this depend on prices, total non durable expenditure, and a host
3of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the household. Under monotonicity of food
demands these functions can be inverted to obtain a measure of non durable consumption in the
PSID.
The paper continues with an illustration of the model we estimate and of the identiﬁcation
strategy we use (Section 2). In Section 3 we discuss data issues and the imputation procedure.
Section 4 contains a discussion of the results and a critical analysis of our ﬁnding. Section 5
concludes. The Appendixes discuss technical details about the approximation of the Euler equation
used in the empirical section, identiﬁcation in the presence of measurement error, estimation details
and the imputation procedure.
2 Income and Consumption dynamics
2.1 The income process
The unit of analysis is a household, comprising a couple and, possibly, their children. Our
sample selection focuses on income risk and we do not model divorce, widowhood, and other
household breaking-up factors. We recognize that these may be important omissions that limit
the interpretation of our study. However, by focusing on stable households and the interaction of
consumption and income we are able to develop a complete identiﬁcation strategy. We also conﬁne
our analysis to links between labor income and consumption that become less important during
retirement. Consequently we only select households during the working life of the husband.
We assume that the main source of uncertainty faced by the consumer is income (deﬁned as
the sum of labor income and transfers, such as welfare payment). We also assume that labor is
supplied inelastically. The income process we consider is:
yi;a;t = Z0
i;a;t' + Pi;a;t + vi;a;t (1)
where a and t index age and time, respectively, y = logY is the log of real income, and Z a set
of observable income characteristics. Equation (1) decomposes current income into a permanent
component Pi;a;t and a transitory or mean-reverting component, vi;a;t. By writing yi;a;t rather than
yi;t we emphasize the importance of cohort eﬀects in the evolution of earnings over the life-cycle
and, more importantly, across generations entering the labor market in diﬀerent time periods (and
4thus facing diﬀerent economic environments and opportunities). In keeping with this remark, we
study consumption decisions separately for diﬀerent cohorts.
For consistency with previous empirical studies (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Moﬃtt
and Gottschalk, 1994; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2002), we assume that the permanent component Pi;a;t
follows a martingale process of the form:
Pi;a;t = Pi;a¡1;t¡1 + ³i;a;t (2)
where ³i;a;t is serially uncorrelated, and the transitory component follows an MA(q) process, where





with µ0 ´ 1. It follows that income growth is:
∆yi;a;t = ∆Z0
it' + ³i;a;t + ∆vi;a;t (3)
The covariance restrictions implied by (3) are explored in the next Section.
2.2 Self Insurance and Consumption Growth






subject to the intertemporal budget constraints and the initial and terminal conditions on ﬁnancial
assets:
Ai;a+j+1;t+j+1 = (1 + r)(Ai;a+j;t+j + Yi;a+j;t+j ¡ Ci;a+j;t+j) (5)
Ai;a;t given (6)
Ai;L;t+L¡a = 0 (7)
The term Di;a+j;t+j includes observable and unobserved taste shifts. We set the end of the life-
cycle at age L and assume that there is no interest rate uncertainty. If preferences are of the CRRA
5form (u(C) = C1¡°¡1
1¡° ), credit markets are perfect and r = ±, then one obtains the approximate
Euler equation (see Appendix A.1 for more details on the approximation):
∆ci;a;t » = Γb;t + ∆Z0
it# + »i;a;t + ¼i;a;t³i;a;t + ®a¼i;a;t"i;a;t (8)
where c = logC is the log of real consumption, ®a a weight that is an increasing function of age,
Γb;t a parameter that varies over time and by cohort (indexed by b), »i;a;t captures idiosyncratic
shocks to tastes over the life cycle, and ¼i;a;t is the share of future labor income in the present value
of lifetime wealth. The term Γb;t is the slope of the consumption path for diﬀerent year of birth
cohorts.3 In the empirical analysis we assume that ®a is a known constant rather than a parameter
to estimate.
For individuals a long time from the end of their life with the value of current ﬁnancial assets
small relative to remaining future labor income, ¼i;a;t ' 1, and permanent shocks pass through
more or less completely into consumption whereas transitory shocks are (almost) completely insured
against through saving. Precautionary saving can provide eﬀective insurance against permanent
shocks only if the stock of assets built up is large relative to future labor income, which is to say ¼i;a;t
is appreciably smaller than unity, in which case there will be some smoothing of permanent shocks
through self insurance. From here onwards we assume ¼i;a;t » = ¼b;t, so that it is approximately
constant within a cohort at any speciﬁc age; furthermore, y and c should be interpreted as the
income and consumption components after removing demographic characteristics and aggregate
eﬀects. The terms Zi;a;t and Γb;t will thus be omitted from now on. The remainder of this section
considers the case ¼b;t ' 1 in which no part of permanent shocks is insured through precautionary
saving. We defer a discussion of the consequences of removing this assumption to Section 4.4.
We assume that ³, v, and » are mutually uncorrelated processes. The only source of serial
correlation, if present, arises from the transitory component vi;a;t. Equations (3) and (8) can be









for s = 0
for s 6= 0
(9)
where var(:) and cov(:;:) denote cross-sectional variances and covariances, respectively (the index i
is consequently omitted). These moments are computed with respect to individuals belonging to an
3Innovations to the conditional variance of consumption growth (precautionary savings) are captured by Γb;t.
6homogenous group (i.e., individuals born in the same year, with the same level of schooling, etc.).
The covariance term cov(∆va;t;∆va+s;t+s) depends on the serial correlation properties of v. If v is
an MA(q) serially correlated process, then cov(∆va;t;∆va+s;t+s) is zero whenever jsj > q+1. Note
also that if v is serially uncorrelated (vi;a;t = "i;a;t), then var(∆va;t) = var("a;t) + var("a¡1;t¡1).
The moment restriction for q = 0 in (9) can be recovered from repeated cross-section data as








in which case the change in the growth of the variance of log income can be used to recover the
variance of the permanent shock and the change in the variance of the transitory shock.











for s = 0 and zero otherwise (due to the martingale assumption). The equivalent repeated cross-







for small ®a and with no permanent taste shocks to consumption. The simple diﬀerence between
the growth in the variance of income and the growth in the variance of consumption then identiﬁes
the growth in the variance of transitory shocks to log income.

















7which allows identiﬁcation of the variance of the permanent shock with one overidentifying restric-
tion per period.
The availability of panel data has several advantages over a repeated cross-sections analysis. In
the latter case identiﬁcation requires assuming that consumption and income are cross-sectionally
orthogonal to past shocks (see also Deaton and Paxson, 1994). This allows one to replace the
unobservable var(∆ca;t) with ∆var(ca;t). Moreover, even if this assumption holds true, the model is
identiﬁed only under a set of restrictive assumptions, such as ﬁnite horizon, lack of serial correlation
in transitory shocks, and absence of measurement error in consumption and income data. Our panel
data approach can handle all these complications (see below). In general, panel data provide more
overidentifying restrictions vis-` a-vis repeated cross-section and thus can aﬀord more ﬂexibility.
To see the advantage of panel data, note for instance that identiﬁcation of the variances of
shocks to income requires only panel data on income, not consumption. In the simple case of





= cov(∆ya;t;∆ya¡1;t¡1 + ∆ya;t + ∆ya+1;t+1) (15)
var("a;t) = ¡cov(∆ya;t;∆ya+1;t+1) (16)
2.3 Partial insurance
We now consider the possibility of partial insurance and suppose there are mechanisms (that we








of permanent and transitory shocks, respectively. We might expect Áb;t to be close to
unity and Ãb;t close to zero. As noted above, precautionary saving might allow partial insurance of
permanent shocks (Áb;t < 1) if assets were large enough relative to future labor income (i.e. ¼b;t < 1),
but interpersonal insurance mechanisms might also underlie this.5 For simplicity of notation, we
conﬁne ourselves to the case where the transitory shock is serially uncorrelated and there are no
taste shocks or idiosyncratic innovations to the variance of consumption growth (»i;a;t = 0). These
extensions are taken up in the empirical analysis.
In the partial insurance case residual income and consumption growth can be written, respec-
4See Meghir and Pistaferri (2002) for a generalization to serially correlated transitory shocks and measurement
error in income.
5If there are no interpersonal mechanisms or transfers of any sort, then Áb;t = Ãb;t = ¼b;t.
8tively, as:
∆yi;a;t = ³i;a;t + ∆"i;a;t (17)
∆ci;a;t » = Áb;t³i;a;t + Ãb;t®a"i;a;t (18)
The economic interpretation of the partial insurance parameter is such that it nests the two polar
cases of full insurance of permanent shocks (Áb;t = Ãb;t = 0), as contemplated by the complete
markets hypothesis, and no insurance (Áb;t = Ãb;t = 1), as predicted by the PIH with just self-
insurance through savings. A value 0 < Áb;t < 1 (0 < Ãb;t < 1) is consistent with partial insurance
with respect to permanent (transitory) shocks. The lower the coeﬃcient, the higher the degree of
insurance.






















Since var(³) and var(") can still be identiﬁed from panel data on income (the ﬁrst three moments
above), there are only two parameters left to identify: Áb;t and Ãb;t. Take ﬁrst the simple case





identiﬁes the extent of insurance against permanent shocks (Ãb;t is obviously not identiﬁed). The
availability of panel data results in more eﬃcient estimates because of the availability of overiden-
tifying restrictions. For example:
Áb;t =
cov(∆ca;t;∆ya;t)
cov(∆ya;t;∆ya¡1;t¡1 + ∆ya;t + ∆ya+1;t+1)
Thus Áb;t is generally overidentiﬁed. Overidentifying restrictions can be tested using standard
methods.
9As a matter of interpretation, note that the numerator of (19) captures the variance of shifts
in consumption. In a model with no transitory shock eﬀects on consumption, consumption growth
volatility depends on the arrival of permanent shifts in income and the availability of insurance
mechanisms above self-insurance. The denominator of (19) measures the association between con-
sumption growth and income growth. In a model with no transitory shocks, consumption growth
tracks income growth only through its long run component. In the absence of partial insurance
mechanisms, the numerator and the denominator will be measuring exactly the same (permanent)
variability in income. Recall that in the self-insurance, inﬁnite-horizon case any permanent shift
in the variance of the distribution of income is paralleled by an equivalent permanent shift in the
variance of the distribution of consumption. With partial insurance, however, the latter is attenu-
ated by the fact that permanent income shocks translate less than one-for-one in consumption; the
amount of attenuation (given by the ratio in 19) is exactly measured by the parameter Áb;t.
In the more general case of ﬁnite L ¡ a and r 6= 0, more complicated expressions are available







cov(∆ya;t;∆ya¡1;t¡1 + ∆ya;t + ∆ya+1;t+1)
and Ãb;t and Áb;t are generally overidentiﬁed in this simple model.
Finally, it is very likely that measurement error will contaminate the observed income and
consumption data. We assume that both consumption and income are measured with multiplicative
(independent and quasi-classical) error,6 e.g.,
y¤





i;a;t = ci;a;t + uc
i;a;t (21)
where x¤ denote a measured variable, x its true, unobservable value, and u the measurement
error. In Appendix A.2 we show that the partial insurance parameter Áb;t remains identiﬁed under
measurement error.
6Quasi-classical in the sense that the variance of the measurement error is not (necessarily) constant over time.
102.4 Information
In the analysis presented so far we have assumed that in the innovation process for income
(17) the random variables ³i;a;t and "i;a;t represent the arrival of new information to the agent i of
age a in period t: If part of this random term was known to the agent then the consumption model
would argue that it should already be incorporated into consumption plans and would not directly
eﬀect consumption growth (18). Suppose a proportion ·³ of the permanent shock was know to the
consumer. Then the consumption growth relationship (18) would become
∆ci;a;t » = e Áb;t·³³i;a;t + Ãb;t®a"i;a;t: (22)
In this case the estimated Áb;t would overstate the extent of partial insurance by the information
factor ·³.
The econometrician will treat ³i;a;t as the permanent shock. Whereas the individual may
have already adapted to this change. Consequently, although transmission of income inequality to
consumption inequality is correctly identiﬁed, the estimated Áb;t has to be interpreted as reﬂecting
a combination of insurance and information. This is discussed further in section 4.4 where we
interpret our empirical results.
3 The data
Our empirical analysis is conducted on two microeconomic data sources: the 1978-1992 PSID and
the 1980-1998 CEX. We describe their main features and our sample selection procedures in turn.
3.1 The PSID
Since the PSID has been widely used for microeconometric research, we shall only sketch the
description of its structure in this section.7
The PSID started in 1968 collecting information on a sample of roughly 5,000 households. Of
these, about 3,000 were representative of the US population as a whole (the core sample), and
about 2,000 were low-income families (the Census Bureau’s SEO sample). Thereafter, both the
original families and their split-oﬀs (children of the original family forming a family of their own)
have been followed.
7See Hill (1992) for more details about the PSID.
11The PSID includes a variety of socio-economic characteristics of the household, including age,
education, labor supply, and income of household members. Questions referring to income are
retrospective; thus, those asked in 1993, say, refer to the 1992 calendar year. In contrast, many
researchers have argued that the timing of the survey questions on food expenditure is much less
clear (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Altonji and Siow, 1987). Typically, the PSID asks how much is
spent on food in an average week. Since interviews are usually conducted around March, it has
been argued that people report their food expenditure for an average week around that period,
rather than for the previous calendar year as is the case for family income. We assume that food
expenditure reported in survey year t refers to the previous calendar year, but check the eﬀect of
alternative assumptions.
Households in the PSID report their taxable family income (which includes transfers and ﬁnan-
cial income). The measure of income used below excludes income from ﬁnancial assets and deﬂates
the corresponding value by the CPI.
Education level is computed using the PSID variable “grades of school ﬁnished”. Individuals
who changed their education level during the sample period are allocated to the highest grade
achieved. We consider two education groups: with and without college education (corresponding
to 13 grades or more and 12 grades or less, respectively).
Since CEX data are available only from 1980, we construct an unbalanced PSID panel using
data from 1978 to 1992 (the ﬁrst two years are retained for initial conditions purposes). Due
to attrition, changes in family composition, and various other reasons, household heads in the
1978-1992 PSID may be present from a minimum of one year to a maximum of ﬁfteen years. We
thus create unbalanced panel data sets of various length. The longest panel includes individuals
present from 1978 to 1992; the shortest, individuals present for two consecutive years only (1978-79,
1979-80, up to 1991-92).
The objective of our sample selection is to focus on a sample of continuously married couples
headed by a male (with or without children). The step-by-step selection of our PSID sample is
illustrated in Table 1. We eliminate households facing some dramatic family composition change
over the sample period. In particular, we keep only those with no change, and those experiencing
changes in members other than the head or the wife (children leaving parental home, say). We
12next eliminate households headed by a female. We also eliminate households with missing report
on education and region,8 and those with topcoded income. We keep continuously married couples
and drop some income outliers.9 We then drop those born before 1920 or after 1959.
As noted above, the initial 1967 PSID contains two groups of households. The ﬁrst is repre-
sentative of the US population (61 percent of the original sample); the second is a supplementary
low income subsample (also known as SEO subsample, representing 39 percent of the original 1967
sample). To account for the changing demographic structure of the US population, starting in 1990
a representative national sample of 2,000 Latino households has been added to the PSID database.
For the most part we exclude both Latino and SEO households and their splitoﬀs. However, we do
consider the robustness of our results in the low income SEO subsample.
Finally, we drop those aged less than 30 or more than 65. This is to avoid problems related to
changes in family composition and education, in the ﬁrst case, and retirement, in the second. The
ﬁnal sample used in the minimum distance exercise below is composed of 17,788 observations and
1,788 households.
We use information on age and the survey year to allocate individuals in our sample to four
cohorts deﬁned on the basis of the year of birth of the household head: born in the 1920s, 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s. Years where cell size is less than 100 are discarded.10
3.2 The CEX
The Consumer Expenditure Survey provides a continuous and comprehensive ﬂow of data
on the buying habits of American consumers. The data are collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and used primarily to revising the CPI. Consumer units are deﬁned as members of a
household related by blood, marriage, adoption, or other legal arrangement, single person living
alone or sharing a household with others, or two or more persons living together who are ﬁnancially
dependent. The deﬁnition of the head of the household in the CEX is the person or one of the
persons who owns or rents the unit; this deﬁnition is slightly diﬀerent from the one adopted in the
8When possible, we impute values for education and region of residence using adjacent records on these variables.
9An income outlier is deﬁned as a household with an income growth above 500 percent, below ¡80 percent, or
with a level of income below $100 a year or below the amount spent on food.
10Median (average) cell sizes are 249 (219), 245 (246), 413 (407), and 398 (363), respectively for those born in the
1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.
13PSID, where the head is always the husband in a couple. We make the two deﬁnitions compatible.
The CEX is based on two survey instruments, the Diary sample and the Interview sample. The
Diary sample interviews households for two consecutive weeks, and it includes detailed expenditures
for food, personal care, and household supplies. The Interview sample follows survey households for
a maximum of 5 quarters, although only inventory and basic sample data are collected in the ﬁrst
quarter. The data base excludes expenditures for housekeeping supplies, personal care products,
and non-prescription drugs. Our analysis below uses only the Interview sample.
The CEX collects information on a variety of socio-demographic variables, including character-
istics of members, characteristics of housing unit, geographic information, inventory of household
appliances, work experience and earnings of members, unearned income, taxes, and other receipts
of consumer unit, credit balances, assets and liabilities, occupational expenses and cash contribu-
tions of consumer unit. Expenditure is reported in each quarter and refers to the previous quarter;
income is reported in the second and ﬁfth interview (with some exceptions), and refers to the pre-
vious twelve months. For consistency with the timing of consumption, ﬁfth-quarter income data
are used.
We select a CEX sample that can be made comparable, to the extent that this is possible,
to the PSID sample. Our initial 1980-1998 CEX sample includes 1,249,329 monthly observations,
corresponding to 141,289 households. We drop those with missing record on food and/or zero total
nondurable expenditure, and those who completed less than 12 month interviews. This is to obtain
a sample where a measure of annual consumption is available. A problem is that many households
report their consumption for overlapping years, i.e. there are people interviewed partly in year
t and partly in year t + 1. Pragmatically, we assume that if the household is interviewed for at
least 6 months at t + 1, then the reference year is t + 1, and it is t otherwise. Prices are adjusted
accordingly. We then sum food at home, food away from home and nondurable expenditure over
the 12 interview months. This gives annual expenditures. We also drop those with zero before-tax
income, those with missing region or education records, single households and those with changes
in family composition. Finally, we eliminate households where the head is born before 1920 or after
1959, those aged less than 30 or more than 65, and those with outlying income (deﬁned as a level
of income below the amount spent on food). Our ﬁnal sample contains 20,974 households. Table 2
14details the sample selection process in the CEX.
The deﬁnition of total non durable consumption is similar to Attanasio and Weber (1995). It
includes food (at home and away from home), alcoholic beverages and tobacco, services, heating
fuel, transports (including gasoline), personal care, clothing and footwear, and rents. It excludes
expenditure on various durables, housing (furniture, appliances, etc.), health, and education.
3.3 Comparing the two data sets
How similar are the two data sets in terms of average demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics? Mean comparisons are reported in Table 3 for selected years: 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989,
and 1992.
PSID respondents are slightly younger than their CEX counterparts; there is, however, little
diﬀerence in terms of family size and composition. The percentage of white is slightly higher in
the PSID. The distribution of the sample by schooling levels is quite similar, while the PSID tends
to under-representing the proportion of people living in the West. Due to slight diﬀerences in the
deﬁnition of family income, PSID ﬁgures are higher than those in the CEX. It is possible that the
deﬁnition of family income in the PSID is more comprehensive than that in the CEX, so resulting
in the underestimation of income in the CEX that appears in the Table.
Trends in food expenditure are initially quite similar, but tend to diverge afterwards. One
explanation for this is that the wording of the food expenditure question in the CEX changed
several times over this period, resulting in PSID ﬁgures being higher than the corresponding CEX
ﬁgures. In particular, the CEX survey question asks about average monthly expenditure over the
last quarter in 1980-81, expenditure in an average week of the last quarter in 1982-87, and reverts
to the monthly expenditure question starting in 1988. Some researchers (Garner et al., 1998)
have noted that the change in the survey question induces a dramatic underestimation of food
expenditure in the CEX in the 1982-87 period.
Food away from home is, in contrast, under-reported in the PSID vis-´ a-vis the CEX. Total
food expenditure (the sum of food at home and food away from home, the one usually adopted
by researchers) is very similar on average in the two surveys (with a diﬀerence that never exceeds
about $300), but it has the disadvantage of mixing necessity (food at home) and luxury (food away)
15consumption.
The last two rows of Table 3 compare the labor market activity of the household head and of
the spouse. Both male and female participation rates are slightly higher in the PSID than in the
CEX.
3.4 The imputation procedure
In deriving the theoretical restrictions above, we have assumed that a researcher has access to
panel data on household income and total non-durable consumption. However, this is a very
strong data requirement. In the US, panel data typically lack household data on total non-durable
consumption; and those surveys, as the CEX, that contains good quality data on consumption, lack
a panel feature. We may however combine the two data sets to impute non durable consumption
to PSID households. This of course requires making some assumptions detailed below.
The PSID collects data on few consumption items, mainly food at home and food away from
home. Moreover, food data are not available in 1987 and 1988. Our strategy is to write a demand
equation for food as a function of prices, demographics, labor supply variables, food away from
home and total non-durable expenditure. Within each cohort, variability of food consumption
is then explained by variability in those components plus unobserved heterogeneity, measurement
error, etc. We can invert this relationship to obtain a measure of the variability in total non-durable
consumption, one of the main objects of interest from the previous section. This inversion operation
requires consistent estimation of the parameters of the demand function for food and monotonicity
of the underlying demand function.
Our paper is not the ﬁrst to combine CEX data with PSID data to impute a measure of non
durable consumption in the PSID (examples include Skinner, 1987; Bernheim et al., 2001; Dynan,
2000). However, we are the ﬁrst to depart from the “Skinner” methodology by using economic
theory rather than a statistical procedure,11 and also the ﬁrst to analyze the econometric conditions
that deﬁne a successful imputation procedure. These are detailed in Appendix A.3.
To make matching of the two data sets feasible, the demand function for food must be invertible
with respect to total expenditure. This requires the demand function to be monotonic in total
11Skinner (1987) regresses non durable consumption on all the consumption items available in both surveys (food
at home, food away from home, utilities, rents, etc.).
16expenditure.12 After some experimentation, we selected a loglinear functional form. The main
advantage of the loglinear demand function is that it provides “ready-to-use” predictions for total
nondurable expenditure, avoiding, for instance, the problem of negative predicted values faced when
using the linear expenditure demand function. The loglinear demand function has also a series of
shortcomings, however. In particular, it cannot capture zero expenditures, it does not satisfy adding
up if applied to all goods in a demand system, and it does not capture apparent non-linearities
in Engel curve relationships. Nevertheless, these shortcomings do not appear particularly relevant
here. There are no zeros in food spending, the speciﬁcation below is applied to just one good, and
the Engel curve for food is not far from being log linear.
Formally, we write the following demand equation for food at home in the CEX:
fi;a;t = M0
i;a;t¹ + ¯ci;a;t + ei;a;t (23)
where f is the log of food expenditure (which is available in both surveys), M contains prices, food
away from home and a set of demographics and labor supply variables (also available in both data
sets), c is the log of total non-durable expenditure (available only in the CEX), and e captures
unobserved heterogeneity in the demand for food and measurement error in food expenditure.
We pool all the CEX data from 1980 to 1998. Our speciﬁcation includes the log of the price
of food at home,13 the interaction of this with region of residence, the log of total nondurable
expenditure and its interaction with education dummies and indicators for number of children
(no children, one child, two or three children, four children or more), indicators for male and
female labor market participation and their interactions with the number of children, food away
from home,14 and a vector of demographics (an age spline, dummies for education and region of
residence, year of birth dummies, indicators for number of children as above, family size and its
interaction with region dummies, and a dummy for whites). We use national prices rather than
time dummies for prediction purposes. Measurement error in nondurable expenditure biases the
expenditure elasticity towards zero; we thus instrument this variable with the log of before-tax
12While theoretically more appealing, ﬂexible functional forms, such as variants of the AIDS model of Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980), or demand functions that are non-linear in total nondurable expenditure or contain interactions
(Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel, 1999), may violate this requirement.
13We omit prices of other commodities due to multicollinearity problems.
14The inclusion of labor market participation variables and food away from home is justiﬁed by a conditional
demand approach.
17income (and interactions with demographics).15 Standard errors are corrected for time clustering.
The estimation results are reported in Table 4. We test the hypotheses that the expenditure
elasticity does not vary with time or cohort and fail to reject the null (p-values above 10 percent
in both cases, see bottom of Table 4).
We estimate an expenditure elasticity of 0.66; this declines with education and increases with
the number of children. The main eﬀect is tightly estimated, and so are most of the interactions.16
The estimate of the price elasticity is ¡0:46, and is precisely measured. Interaction of the price
variable with region dummies are insigniﬁcant. Other demographics have the expected sign. Labor
market participation reduces expenditure on food at home (more strongly so for females); the eﬀect
of male participation is insigniﬁcant but becomes stronger in the presence of more children; food
at home and food away from home are substitutes.17
Armed with the estimated demand parameters, we invert the demand equation for food and
obtain a measure of total nondurable expenditure in the PSID matching on observable charac-
teristics that are common to the two data sets. As explained in Appendix A.3, a good inversion
procedure should produce a variance of (imputed) consumption in the PSID that is higher than
the variance of consumption in the CEX by an additive factor (the variance of the error term of
the demand equation scaled by the squared expenditure elasticity). If this factor is constant over
time the trends in the two variances should be identical.
Trends in the variance of consumption are indeed remarkably similar in the two data sets, as
Figure 1 shows (variances are smoothed via a rolling third-order moving average). Between 1980
and 1986 the variance of PSID imputed consumption and the variance of CEX row consumption
are growing at a similar rate. Afterwards, they are ﬂat. The levels diﬀer by a common factor,
see Appendix A.3. This evidence provides conﬁdence in our use of imputed data to estimate the
parameters of interest discussed in Section 2.
15This is important as far as replicating trends in consumption variance is concerned (see Appendix A.3).
16The expenditure elasticity is lower in the OLS case.
17We could not ﬁnd powerful and sensible exclusion restrictions to instrument labor market participation variables
and food away from home.
184 The results
We organize the empirical analysis in three parts: repeated cross-sections evidence (section 4.1),
unrestricted consumption-income autocovariance estimation from the PSID (section 4.2), and min-
imum distance estimation using longitudinal data on household income and predicted consumption
(section 4.3). We then discuss our ﬁndings and a variety of experiments (Section 4.4).
4.1 Consumption Inequality and Income Uncertainty - Repeated Cross-Section
Evidence from the CEX
Before presenting estimates of the consumption model based on longitudinal PSID data on income
and imputed consumption, it is worth discussing the results of a straightforward replication of
the strategy used in Blundell and Preston (1998). To this purpose, we use (10), (12), and (14)
to estimate the variance of the permanent shock and the change in the variance of the transitory
shocks from repeated CEX cross-sections. We use data from 1980 to 1992.
Table 5 reports simple estimates of the variance of log consumption, the variance of log income,
and their covariance for all years and for four year of birth cohorts (born in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s
and 1950s).18 Figure 2 graphs income and consumption variances and their covariance over the
life cycle (we smooth trends using a rolling MA(3)). For the two middle cohorts the variance of
consumption increases throughout the sample period (both variance grow very moderately in the
second half of the 1980s). For the youngest cohort the variance of income is ﬂat while the variance
of consumption actually declines. Finally, for the oldest cohort both variances increase in the early
1980s and decline afterward. Trends in covariances resemble those for the consumption variance
(the level is higher).
Table 6 reports optimal minimum distance estimates of ∆var(v) and var(³) for three diﬀerent
models: a fully stationary model in which these variances are restricted to being identical across
the whole data period, a non-stationary model where the variances shift between 1986 and 1987,
and a non-stationary model where the variances shift between 1984 and 1985 and between 1988
and 1989.
We ﬁrst comment on the results obtained in the whole sample, without distinguishing by year
18These are the variances of deviations of consumption and income per household member from the cohort-speciﬁc
cross-sectional means. The covariance is the covariance of such residuals.
19of birth. The ﬁrst and most restrictive model shows an increase in the variance of transitory shocks
to log income (income instability), associated with a small variance of the permanent shock. The
results for the second model in which there is one jump in parameters between 1986 and 1987,
show that the variance of the permanent shock is high in the ﬁrst half of the sample period and
statistically insigniﬁcant around zero in the second. The ﬁnal and least restrictive speciﬁcation
conﬁrms this pattern, but also shows that transitory uncertainty accelerates in 1981-84 and 1989-
92, while it remains ﬂat in 1985-88.
The evidence by cohort is somewhat similar. For all cohorts but the oldest transitory income
uncertainty increases throughout the 1980s. The variance of the permanent shock is generally
higher in the early 1980s then in the late 1980s or early 1990s. For the individuals born in the
1920s the shifts in transitory uncertainty appear to be a cyclical phenomenon.
This evidence squares quite well with the ﬁgures presented above. However, there is an inherent
bias in repeated cross-section analyses that neglect the possibility of insurance over and above
savings. Suppose ®a is small, q = 0, and that there is partial insurance with respect to permanent
shocks as in Section 2.3. Then the diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategy used in Blundell and Preston
(1998):










fails to identify shifts in transitory uncertainty unless Áb;t = 1 and there is no insurance of perma-
nent shocks. In general, it provides an upward biased estimate. By the same token, with partial









are downward biased es-
timates of the variance of permanent shocks (a possible explanation for why those variances are
quite small throughout Table 6).19 The model we estimate below uses panel data and allows for
partial insurance as well as other generalizations, such as measurement error.
4.2 Autocovariance Estimates of Consumption and Income: Longitudinal Evi-
dence from the Matched PSID
The PSID data set contains longitudinal records on income and imputed consumption. We remove
the eﬀect of deterministic eﬀects on log (imputed) consumption and income by separate regressions
19The bias when using ∆cov(ca;t;ya;t) is generally lower than ∆var(ca;t;ya;t) as long as Áb;t < 1. In fact, in most
cases cov(ca;t;ya;t) grows more rapidly than var(ca;t;ya;t).
20of these variables on a set of observable family characteristics (a quartic in age, education dum-
mies, year dummies, race dummies, family size, number of children, dummies for self-employment
and employment status, and region dummies). These variables reﬂect deterministic growth in con-
sumption and income (information). We then work with the residuals of these regressions (we run
diﬀerent regressions for diﬀerent cohorts/education groups), ci;a;t and yi;a;t.
To pave the way to the formal analysis of Section 4.3, Table 7 reports unrestricted minimum
distance estimates of several moments of interest for the whole sample: the variance of unexplained
income growth, var(∆ya;t), the ﬁrst-order autocovariances (cov(∆ya+1;t+1;∆ya;t)), and the second-
order autocovariances (cov(∆ya+2;t+2;∆ya;t)). Estimates are reported for each year. Table 8
repeats the exercise for our measure of consumption. Finally, Table 9 reports minimum distance
estimates of contemporaneous and lagged consumption-income covariances.
Looking through Table 7, one can notice the strong increase in the variance of income growth,
especially in the early 1980s. Also notice the strong blip in ﬁnal year (in 1992 the PSID converted
the questionnaire to electronic form and imputations of income done by machine). The absolute
value of the ﬁrst-order autocovariance also exhibits an inverted [-shape. Second- and higher order
autocovariances are small and only in few cases statistically insigniﬁcant. At least at face value,
this evidence seems to tally quite well with a canonical MA(1) process, as implied by a traditional
income process given by the sum of a martingale permanent component and a serially uncorrelated
transitory component.20
Table 8 shows that the variance of imputed consumption growth increases quite strongly in
the early 1980s, peaks in 1984 and then it is essentially ﬂat afterwards. Note the high value of
the variance which is clearly the result of our imputation procedure. The variance of consumption
growth captures in fact the genuine association with shocks to income, but also the contribution of
taste shocks and measurement error. The absolute value of the ﬁrst-order autocovariance of con-
sumption growth should be a good estimate of the variance of the imputation error. This is in fact
quite high and approximately stable over time. Second-order consumption growth autocovariances
are mostly statistically insigniﬁcant and economically small.
Table 9 looks at the association, at various lags, of unexplained income and consumption growth.
20Since evidence on second-order autocovariances is mixed, in estimation we allow for MA(1) serial correlation in
the transitory component.
21The contemporaneous covariance should be informative about the eﬀect of income shocks on con-
sumption growth if measurement error in consumption are orthogonal to measurement error in
income. This covariance increases in the early 1980s and then bounces around afterwards.
The covariance between current consumption growth and future income growth cov(∆ca;t;∆ya+1;;t+1)
should reﬂect the extent of insurance with respect to transitory shocks. Note that in the pure self-
insurance case and with inﬁnite horizon, the impact of transitory shocks on consumption growth is
the annuity value r
1+r . With a small interest rate, this will be indistinguishable from zero, at least
statistically. The addition of partial insurance Ãb;t < 1 makes this even more likely. In fact, this
covariance is hardly statistically signiﬁcant and economically close to zero. The formal analysis
below conﬁrms this.
The covariance between current consumption growth and past income growth cov(∆ca;t;∆ya¡1;;t¡1)
plays no role in the PIH model with perfect capital markets, but may be important in alternative
models where liquidity constraints are present. Also in this case, however, estimates are close to
zero at least for this sample.
To sum up, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the income process
∆y¤
i;a;t = ³i;a;t + ∆vi;a;t + ∆u
y
i;a;t
(with the permanent shock ³ and measurement error uy being mutually and serially uncorrelated
and the transitory shock v possibly MA(1)) ﬁts the data suﬃciently well. Additionally, there is
weak evidence that transitory shocks impact consumption growth or that liquidity constraints are
empirically important. We now turn to formal minimum distance estimation of the insurance and
variance parameters.
4.3 Partial Insurance
We estimate the parameters that characterize the income and consumption process by optimal
minimum distance. Technical details are in Appendix A.4.
We report the results of a simple non-stationary model where the parameters vary across cohorts
or education groups (depending on the speciﬁcation adopted) and time: in particular, we assume
that they shift at some point over the 1980s (consistent with most of the Figures discussed above).
22There are several parameters to estimate: the variances of the permanent and transitory income
shocks (¾2
³ and ¾2
", respectively), the MA coeﬃcient µ of the transitory shock, the variance of taste
shocks (¾2
») and imputation error (¾2
u), the partial insurance coeﬃcient for the permanent shock
(Á) and for the transitory shock (Ã). We assume L ¡ a ! 1 and thus the annuitization factor
®a =
r(1+r¡µ)
(1+r)2 , where µ is the MA(1) parameter of the transitory income component. We set
r = 0:05.
Table 10 reports the results of the model for the whole sample, four year of birth cohorts
(born in the 1950s, 1940s, 1930s, and 1920s), and two education groups (with and without college
education).
Starting with income growth parameters, note that the variance of the permanent shocks gen-
erally declines after 1985 (with the single exception of those with college education), while the
variance of transitory shocks generally increases (with the single exception of those born in the
1940s). Transitory shocks also become more persistent. Some of the shifts are quite dramatic: for
instance the variance of permanent shocks halves for the oldest cohort and the variance of the tran-
sitory shock doubles for the cohort born in the 1930s. Note ﬁnally that the variance of permanent
shocks declines (and the variance of transitory shocks increases) with the year of entry in the labor
market and with education.
Turning to consumption parameters, note that the imputation error absorbs a large amount of
the cross-sectional variability in consumption in the PSID, anything between 0.08 and 0.12. The
variance of the imputation error ¾2
u is always precisely measured. The variance of taste shocks is
also sizable and generally well measured.
In the whole sample the estimate of Á, the partial insurance coeﬃcient for the permanent shock,
provides evidence in favor of partial insurance and rejects both the complete markets assumption
(Á = 0) and the traditional self-insurance hypothesis (where Á = 1). In contrast, the evidence on
Ã accords with a simple PIH model with inﬁnite horizon. In no case do we reject the null that
there is full smoothing with respect to transitory shocks (Ã = 0). Finally note that the insurance
coeﬃcient Á almost doubles between the early 1980s and the late 1980s-early 1990s, suggesting
that the degree of insurance has declined over this period. This may also reﬂect the nature of the
permanent shocks that occurred over this period rather than a change in the insurance mechanisms
23themselves.
When the sample is stratiﬁed by year of birth or education, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results:
there is evidence for partial insurance with respect to the permanent shocks, full insurance with
respect to transitory shocks, and a decline in the insurance opportunities of permanent income
shocks that occurred after 1984. The evidence across cohorts does not reveal any economically
interesting heterogeneity in the degree of insurance available to consumers, perhaps because of
small cell sizes that inﬂate standard errors; those with college education appear to be more able to
smooth consumption in the face of permanent shocks to income. For individuals without college
education there is no evidence for insurance against permanent income shocks in the second half
of the sample period.
Finally, the Â2 goodness of ﬁt statistics reveal some support for our model speciﬁcation despite
its simplicity for certain of the periods and household types.
4.4 Discussion: Information, Insurance and Measurement
In this section we provide further interpretation of our results and discuss potential sources of bias
in our estimates. For simplicity, we focus on the case of Áb;t, the partial insurance coeﬃcient with
respect to the permanent shocks, and on the results for the 1985-92 period. Those for 1979-84
are qualitatively identical and hence omitted. Table 11 reports the results of various sensitivity
checks on our assumptions concerning information and the origin of insurance. Table 12 reports
additional sensitivity analysis results on measurement issues: our imputation procedure, sample
selection, and estimation methods used.
4.4.1 Information
As discussed in section 2.4, it is conceivable that what appears to the researcher as an unpre-
dictable innovation is in fact known to the individual who may have advance notice of events such
as promotions, layoﬀs, absences from work, etc. Although we still correctly measure the degree
by which income inequality is transmitted into consumption inequality, in the absence of extra
information we cannot distinguish between genuine uninsured uncertainty and income variability
known to the individual. The main consequence of acknowledging the discrepancy of information
that exists between the consumer and the econometrician is that Áb;t can be biased downward to
24reﬂect superior information of households, rather than insurance.
While we cannot test for superior information directly, we can provide some suggestive evidence
by restricting the set of predictors ∆Zit of income growth in (3). In column (2) of Table 11 we predict
income growth using just time dummies, education dummies and an age polynomial, and obtain an
estimate of Á of 0.31. The full set of predictors in the basic speciﬁcation gives an estimate of 0.52
(see “Baseline” column). Thus enriching the information set available to consumers produces larger
estimates of Á as predicted by the information story. This exercise relies on arbitrary assumptions
about the information used by consumers and must be taken with caution.
Along similar lines, it can be argued that the timing of the PSID survey question on food is
generating a downward biased estimate of Áb;t. This is the case if food reported in survey year
t refers to the current year rather than t ¡ 1 and thus include advance information on income
innovations (to which PIH consumers do not respond). Since food is typically asked in the ﬁrst
quarter of year t, a possible correction is to assume that households have some advance information
about income innovations at time t when they decide their consumption at t ¡ 1, as in Hall and
Mishkin (1982). Alternatively, one can make the assumption that the PSID food expenditure data
reported at t refers to a typical week of that year. We re-estimate our model changing the timing of
the food question. The results (see column 3, Table 11) show that this adjustment produces some
eﬀects (less evidence for insurance), but does not change the whole picture dramatically. We still
reject the PIH and complete insurance and we still ﬁnd evidence for full insurance of transitory
shocks and (albeit more limited) partial insurance of permanent shocks.
4.4.2 Distinguishing Permanent and Transitory Shocks in Income
Suppose that individual are not able to distinguish between transitory and permanent income
shocks, i.e., instead of (3) they observe:
∆yi;a;t = ∆Z0
it' + &i;a;t ¡ ½1&i;a¡1;t¡1 ¡ ½2&i;a¡2;t¡2
and the Euler equation in the inﬁnite horizon case is:
∆ci;a;t » = Γb;t + ∆Z0
it# + »i;a;t + Áb;tΘ(r;½1;½2)&i;a;t




(1+r)2. Column (4) of Table 11 reports the results of this speciﬁcation.
The partial insurance coeﬃcient estimate is smaller than in the baseline case (0.33 vs. 0.52),
implying that agents’ inability to distinguish short-run from long-run shocks in income cannot
explain the downward bias (if any) in the estimate of Áb;t in the general model.
4.4.3 Insuring Income Shocks through Durables, Housing and Education
Consider that the PIH could hold with respect to total consumption rather than non-durable
consumption, the measure we use. The main consequence of this is that the Euler equation contains
an omitted variable, the growth in the fraction of total consumption that is devoted to non-durable
expenditure. If general Áb;t will reﬂect, at least in part, the sensitivity of durable expenditure
to income shocks. It is possible to correct for this by extending our analysis to a measure of
consumption that includes durable expenditure. This is available in the CEX and our imputation
procedure can easily handle such extension. In column (5) of Table 11 we add expenditure on
health and education to our measure of consumption. The results are essentially the same as in the
baseline speciﬁcation. In column (6) we use a comprehensive measure of consumption that includes
durables and nondurables; this has a rather dramatic eﬀect on our results, we now ﬁnd no evidence
for partial insurance with respect to permanent shocks and again evidence for full insurance as far
as transitory shocks are concerned.21
These results suggest that most of the insurance we estimate in the baseline model arises from
optimal durable choice and timing, as argued, among others by Browning and Crossley (2001a).22
It also appears to dismiss the relevance of the information story discussed above.
4.4.4 The Insurance Value of Taxes and Transfers
To see the impact of public insurance, suppose we exclude transfers (of any kind) from our measure
of income. If taxes and transfers provide insurance for permanent income shocks, the insurance
parameter in this speciﬁcation should fall by an amount that reﬂects the degree of insurance. This
21Total consumption includes food (at home and away from home), alcoholic beverages, tobacco, housing (utilities,
fuels and public services, mortgage interests, property tax, maintenance and repairs, rents, other lodging, domestic
services, textiles, furniture, ﬂoor coverings, appliances), clothing and footwear, transports (new and used cars, other
vehicles, gasoline, vehicle ﬁnance charges and insurance, maintenance and repairs, rentals and leases, public trans-
ports), personal care, entertainment, health (insurance, prescription drugs, medical services), reading and education,
cash contributions, and personal insurance (life insurance and retirement).
22In column (7) this story is conﬁrmed for the sample that includes low income households.
26happens because still consumption incorporates any insurance value of taxes and transfers but
the new measure of income no longer does. The results of this experiment are reported in the
last column of Table 11. A comparison of column (1) and column (8) shows that the estimated
insurance parameter declines from 0.52 to 0.30. That is by excluding transfers the partial insurance
coeﬃcient drops by 40%, an estimate of the insurance provided by private and public transfers.
This insurance can also be seen through the change in the estimated variance of permanent shocks.
With taxes and transfers excluded, the variance of permanent shocks is indeed much higher.
4.4.5 Precautionary Asset Accumulation
The assumption ¼i;a;t ' 1 made in Section 2.2 could be violated in the presence of precautionary
asset accumulation. This could be particularly relevant for cohorts close to retirement, and it would
signal partial insurance even when this is absent. However, focusing on young cohorts allows us to
address this point directly, because young individuals a long time from retirement have very little
precautionary assets to rely on. Nevertheless, one can notice that for the oldest cohort (where the
bias should be more severe) we ﬁnd a very high partial insurance coeﬃcient (see Table 10), while for
young cohorts the insurance coeﬃcient is similar to that estimated for the whole sample. Finally,
while we cannot separately identify precautionary saving eﬀects (¼) from insurance eﬀects (Á), we
still pin down the degree of transmission of income shocks into consumption.
4.4.6 The Speciﬁcation of Imputation Error
Our imputation procedure requires that the variance of predicted consumption diﬀer from the
variance of true consumption only by an additive term (which is estimated, see ¾2
u in Table 10).
But if in addition to this there is a scaling factor, the latter is generally not separately identiﬁable
from the partial insurance parameter Áb;t. Thus the estimate of Áb;t will be biased (upward, if the
problem resembles that discussed in Appendix A.3). However, we have checked that this is not
the case (see the discussion in the Appendix). As a further check, in column (2) of Table 12, we
use PSID food data directly without imputing; the estimate of the partial insurance coeﬃcient in
this column (0.33) should be scaled by the food expenditure income elasticity (0.66, from Table
4) giving, e.g., 0:33
0:66 = 0:5, which isn’t far from the coeﬃcient estimated with imputed data in
the “Baseline” column. This is evidence that our imputation procedure is not responsible for the
27results.
4.4.7 Low Incomes and Young Households
In column (3) of Table 12 we include families from the poverty subsample of the PSID. Two results
are worth mentioning: the estimate of Á is slightly higher reﬂecting less insurance opportunities in
this sample, and we now reject full insurance with respect to transitory shocks (an estimate of Ã of
0.13, similar to the 0.2 benchmark found by other researchers, Hall and Mishkin, 1982). In fact, in
this subsample alone there is not much evidence for insurance altogether. In column (4) we focus
on this subsample and ﬁnd that we cannot reject the null that Á = 1, while still ﬁnding evidence
of less than full insurance with respect to the transitory shock.
In column (5) we include those aged 20-29, and ﬁnd results that are similar to the baseline
scenario.
In column (6) we use the sum of food at home and the monetary value of food stamps as
our measure of consumption; the coeﬃcient on the permanent shock is lower than in column
(2), suggesting that food stamps provide insurance, but the diﬀerence is unlikely to be statistically
signiﬁcant. However, when we add the low income subsample (see column 7) the coeﬃcient is much
lower and suggests an important insurance role for food stamps. These issues are explored more in
depth in Blundell and Pistaferri (2002). Overall, the results suggest that transfer programs appear
partially successful in providing insurance only for marginal populations (low income groups) and/or
marginal components of household consumption (food). This should not be seen as diminutive of the
role and value of transfer programs, because helping low income households to aﬀord an adequate
consumption of food, health and shelter is precisely the objective of these programs.
4.4.8 Estimation Methods
As said above, the parameters of all our models are estimated by OMD. In general, the choice
is between a non-linear least squares procedure (equally weighted minimum distance, or EWMD)
and a non-linear generalized least squares procedure (optimal minimum distance, or OMD). Altonji
and Segal (1996) show that EWMD dominates OMD even for moderately large sample sizes. We
ﬁnd no dramatic diﬀerences between OMD and EWMD, however (see the last column of Table 12).
There is a small downward bias in the variance of the permanent income shock but the estimate
28of the insurance coeﬃcient is similar to that reported in the baseline speciﬁcation, and so is the
evidence for full insurance of transitory shocks.
5 Conclusions
The extensive research on the dynamics of income inequality in recent years has not been paral-
leled by comparable research on consumption inequality. The existing research has either reached
contrasting conclusions (some papers ﬁnd an increase in consumption inequality, while others ﬁnd
little or no change),23 or made little attempt to interpret the empirical ﬁndings using traditional
consumption theory.24
This paper used individual panel data on consumption and income to evaluate the degree of
consumption insurance with respect to income shocks. Our framework allowed for self-insurance,
in which consumers smooth idiosyncratic shocks through saving. It also considered the complete
markets assumption in which all idiosyncratic shocks are insured. These two models sit amidst
a wide range of missing insurance opportunities. We were able to assess the degree of insurance
over and above self-insurance through savings. We did this by contrasting shifts in the cross-
sectional distribution of income growth with shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of consumption
growth, and analyzing the way these two measures of household welfare correlate over time. Our
identiﬁcation strategy was applied to a semi-structural model of consumption behavior. A major
innovation of our study was to combine panel data on income from the PSID with consumption
data from repeated CEX cross-sections in a structural way, i.e. using conventional demand analysis
rather than reduced form imputation procedures. We also allowed for heterogeneity in a very general
way.
Our results show a strong growth in both permanent and transitory income shocks in the US
during the early 1980s. The variance of permanent shocks levels oﬀ thereafter. We ﬁnd strong
23Thus Cutler and Katz (1992) ﬁnd evidence that consumption inequality increases in parallel with income in-
equality, while Slesnick (1994) shows that consumption inequality has historically fallen and raised only slightly in
recent years.
24Thus Dynarski and Gruber (1997) regress consumption growth on income growth (instrumented to avoid the
downward bias due to measurement error), and interpret the coeﬃcient on income growth as measuring the extent of
insurance against income shocks (i.e., as the discrepancy between income and consumption inequality). While their
analysis is valuable, the interpretation of their estimates outside a structural consumption model is problematic. The
modern theory of consumption makes a sharp distinction between the eﬀect of anticipated and unanticipated income
growth (and between transitory and permanent income growth), which is absent in their analysis.
29evidence against full insurance for permanent income shocks but not for transitory income shocks.
Interestingly, this latter result needs adapting for the low income subsample where transitory shocks
seem less insurable. Further there is evidence of partial insurance of permanent income shocks;
the results point to much of this partial insurance occurring through the adjustment of durable
expenditures. We also ﬁnd diﬀerences in the degree of insurance over time, although we are unable
to distinguish changing insurance opportunities from changing nature of shocks. Finally we show
that taxes and transfers provide an important insurance mechanism for permanent income shocks.
Our results have implications for both macroeconomics and labor economics. The macroe-
conomic literature has long been concerned with explaining why modern economies depart from
the complete markets benchmark. Recent work has examined the role of asymmetric information,
moral hazard, heterogeneity, etc., and asked whether the complete markets model can be amended
to include some form of imperfect insurance. This issue has not been subject to a systematic em-
pirical investigation. Insofar as lack of smoothing opportunities implies a greater vulnerability to
income shocks, our research can be relevant to issues of the incidence and permanence of poverty
studied in the labor economics literature. Studying how well families smooth income shocks, how
this changes over time in response to changes in the economic environment confronted, and how
diﬀerent household types diﬀer in their smoothing opportunities, is an important complement to
understanding the eﬀect of redistributive policies and anti-poverty strategies.
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34Table 1
Sample selection in the PSID
# dropped # remain
Initial sample (1968-1992) 145,940 145,940
Interviewed prior to 1978 52,408 93,532
Change in family composition 18,570 74,962
Female head 23,779 51,183
Missing values and topcoding 308 50,875
Change in marital status 5,882 44,993
Income outliers 2,407 42,586
Born before 1920 or after 1959 8,510 34,076
Poverty subsample 12,600 21,476
Aged less than 30 or more than 65 3,674 17,778
Table 2
Sample selection in the CEX
# dropped # remain
Initial sample 141,289 141,289
Missing expenditure data 1,351 139,938
Present for less than 12 months 76,773 63,165
Zero before-tax income 2,131 61,034
Missing region or education 5,084 55,986
Marital status 24,025 31,960
Born before 1920 or after 1959 7,071 24,889
Aged less than 30 or more than 65 2,968 21,921
Income outliers 947 20,974
35Table 3
Comparison of means, PSID and CEX
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
PSID CEX PSID CEX PSID CEX PSID CEX PSID CEX
Age 42.96 43.71 43.36 45.01 43.83 46.03 43.97 45.26 45.91 47.01
Family size 3.61 3.95 3.52 3.74 3.48 3.64 3.44 3.61 3.42 3.55
# of children 1.32 1.47 1.25 1.26 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.17 1.14 1.15
White 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.88
HS dropout 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15
HS graduate 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30
College dropout 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.55
Northeast 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23
Midwest 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.29
South 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.26
West 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.22
Family income 32,759 29,078 37,907 35,587 45,035 43,473 52,919 50,690 61,911 55,956
Food at home 3,683 3,501 3,905 3,305 4,176 3,501 4,557 4,266 5,098 4,565
Food away 759 1,165 936 1,334 1,118 1,695 1,281 1,881 1,507 1,857
Total food 4,442 4,666 4,841 4,639 5,294 5,196 5,838 6,146 6,604 6,422
c 9.74 9.47 9.77 9.58 9.85 9.70 9.92 9.83 10.04 9.88
Husband’s particip. 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.88
Wife’s particip. 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.74 0.71 0.78 0.73 0.77 0.73
36Table 4
The demand for food in the CEX
This table reports IV estimates of the demand equation for (the logarithm of) food at home in the CEX.
We instrument the log of total nondurable expenditure (and its interaction with age and education dummies)
with the log of family before-tax income (and its interaction with age and education dummies).





















































































P-value test that ¯ does not vary with time 0.1056
P-value test that ¯ does not vary with cohort 0.1184
37Table 5
Consumption and income variances and covariances,
CEX 1980-1992
Born 1920s Born 1930s
var(c) var(y) cov(c;y) var(c) var(y) cov(c;y)
1980 0.2315 0.4860 0.4230 0.2184 0.4479 0.4009
1981 0.2500 0.5567 0.4789 0.2523 0.4618 0.4616
1982 0.2470 0.5874 0.4836 0.2344 0.4830 0.4591
1983 0.2678 0.5657 0.5358 0.2472 0.5424 0.5194
1984 0.2729 0.6053 0.5375 0.2712 0.6245 0.5412
1985 0.3060 0.7733 0.5836 0.2652 0.6013 0.4999
1986 0.2706 0.6963 0.5069 0.2970 0.6008 0.6067
1987 0.2849 0.7177 0.6205 0.2422 0.5404 0.4194
1988 0.2522 0.6562 0.4788 0.3014 0.7079 0.5498
1989 0.2765 0.4751 0.4691 0.3213 0.5681 0.5624
1990 0.2379 0.7406 0.4769 0.2840 0.6094 0.5154
1991 0.2757 0.4989 0.5591 0.2982 0.7166 0.6482
1992 0.3240 0.6334 0.5004 0.2747 0.6677 0.5030
Born 1940s Born 1950s
var(c) var(y) cov(c;y) var(c) var(y) cov(c;y)
1980 0.2115 0.3646 0.3933 0.1155 0.2654 0.1562
1981 0.1921 0.4107 0.3609 0.2499 0.4438 0.3563
1982 0.2137 0.4904 0.4281 0.2291 0.4793 0.4194
1983 0.2030 0.4892 0.4060 0.3005 0.5715 0.4979
1984 0.2187 0.4915 0.4289 0.2438 0.5166 0.5005
1985 0.2371 0.4488 0.4198 0.2552 0.4765 0.4337
1986 0.3031 0.5443 0.5784 0.2678 0.5970 0.5374
1987 0.2263 0.5521 0.4638 0.2356 0.5250 0.4220
1988 0.2889 0.5664 0.4959 0.2262 0.5008 0.4373
1989 0.2461 0.5467 0.4791 0.2569 0.5514 0.4470
1990 0.2975 0.6343 0.5268 0.2252 0.5131 0.4243
1991 0.2931 0.5672 0.5028 0.2454 0.5756 0.4315
1992 0.2657 0.6230 0.4724 0.2286 0.5184 0.4204
38Table 6
Repeated cross-section estimates of income shock variances,
CEX 1980-1992
Time period Whole Born in Born in Born in Born in


























































































































The autocovariance matrix of income growth
Year var(∆yt) cov(∆yt+1;∆yt) cov(∆yt+2;∆yt)
1980 0.0973 -0.0238 -0.0031
(0.0104) (0.0043) (0.0042)
1981 0.0853 -0.0292 -0.0049
(0.0082) (0.0040) (0.0038)
1982 0.0826 -0.0279 -0.0065
(0.0062) (0.0041) (0.0034)
1983 0.0918 -0.0219 -0.0103
(0.0084) (0.0041) (0.0048)
1984 0.0938 -0.0344 -0.0044
(0.0068) (0.0043) (0.0033)
1985 0.1269 -0.0411 -0.0022
(0.0183) (0.0079) (0.0045)
1986 0.1131 -0.0398 -0.0130
(0.0081) (0.0059) (0.0042)
1987 0.1214 -0.0389 0.0028
(0.0103) (0.0055) (0.0047)
1988 0.1008 -0.0354 -0.0033
(0.0088) (0.0047) (0.0035)
1989 0.1014 -0.0309 -0.0028
(0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0041)







The autocovariance matrix of consumption growth
Year var(∆ct) cov(∆ct+1;∆ct) cov(∆ct+2;∆ct)
1980 0.2605 -0.1375 0.0011
(0.0225) (0.0198) (0.0109)
1981 0.2728 -0.1235 0.0017
(0.0241) (0.0159) (0.0104)
1982 0.2792 -0.1391 0.0067
(0.0234) (0.0188) (0.0107)
1983 0.3088 -0.1426 -0.0012
(0.0269) (0.0158) (0.0104)
1984 0.3348 -0.1470 -0.0186
(0.0299) (0.0259) (0.0187)
1985 0.3264 -0.1399 NA
(0.0301) (0.0194)
1986 0.3094 NA NA
(0.0234)
1987 NA NA NA
1988 NA NA NA
1989 NA NA NA
1990 0.3426 -0.1149 -0.0062
(0.0335) (0.0125) (0.0108)
1991 0.3416 -0.1694 NA
(0.0239) (0.0206)
1992 0.3203 NA NA
(0.0238)
41Table 9
The consumption-income growth covariance matrix
Year cov(∆yt;∆ct) cov(∆yt;∆ct+1) cov(∆yt+1;∆ct)
1980 0.0022 0.0075 0.0026
(0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0064)
1981 0.0146 -0.0044 -0.0080
(0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0051)
1982 0.0156 -0.0018 -0.0066
(0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0044)
1983 0.0248 -0.0083 -0.0052
(0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0069)
1984 0.0264 -0.0108 -0.0012
(0.0070) (0.0052) (0.0065)
1985 0.0156 0.0026 -0.0068
(0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0051)
1986 0.0229 NA 0.0036
(0.0057) (0.0079)
1987 NA NA NA
1988 NA NA NA
1989 NA 0.0064 NA
(0.0070)
1990 0.0028 -0.0018 0.0046
(0.0083) (0.0053) (0.0076)
1991 0.0131 -0.0057 -0.0080
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0066)
1992 0.0178 NA NA
(0.0066)
42Table 10
Minimum distance partial insurance and variance estimates
This table reports minimum distance estimates of the parameters of interest: µ is the MA(1) coeﬃcient
of the transitory component of income, ¾2
u the variance of the measurement error in consumption, ¾2
» the
variance of idiosyncratic taste shocks/innovation to the conditional variance of consumption growth, ¾2
³ the
variance of permanent shocks to income, ¾2
" the variance of transitory shock to income, Á and Ã the partial
insurance coeﬃcients with respect to permanent and transitory income shocks, respectively. We assume
L ¡ a ! 1, and an interest rate of 5 percent.
Born 1950s Born 1940s Born 1930s Born 1920s
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Information, Durables, and Transfers
The ﬁrst column reports the results of the baseline speciﬁcation. In column (2) we predicts lny just with
year dummies, an age polynomial, and education dummies. In column (3) we assume that food expenditure
reported at t refers to t (not t ¡ 1). In column (4) we assume that people do not distinguish between
transitory and permanent shocks. In column (5) we add health and education expenditure to our measure
of nondurable consumption. In column (6) we use a measure of total consumption. Column (7) repeats the
experiment performed in column (6) but adds the SEO subsample. Finally, in column (8) we use a measure
of income that excludes transfers.






































































































































Imputation, Sample Selection, and Estimation
The ﬁrst column reports the results of the baseline speciﬁcation. In column (2) we use food expenditure
as our measure of consumption. In column (3) we include the SEO subsample. Column (4) reports the
results for the SEO subsample alone. In column (5) we include those aged 20-29. In column (6) we use the
sum of food at home and the monetary value of food stamps as our measure of consumption. Column (7)
repeats the experiment performed in column (6) but adds the SEO subsample. Finally, in column (8) we
report EWMD estimates.

















































































































































Taking a Taylor expansion around lnXt+k = lnXt +
Pk

















































Take the simple consumption income model
∆ct+k = Á»t+k + Á!t+k
∆yt+k = °t+k + ∆"t+k + ³t+k:







where T is death, L is retirement and qt+k is appropriate discount factor
Qk
i=1(1 + rt+i), k = 1;:::;T ¡ t













t+k;L[lnYt+k ¡ lnqt+k ¡ ln®
°¡r
t+k;L]






1Taking diﬀerences in expectations and allowing for revisions to ! gives

































For large L ¡ t we may be prepared to assume that ®
°¡r
t;L is small enough to be ignored and ¼t ' 1.
The terms on the second line are common within the cohort and therefore do not aﬀect the evolution of
variances.
A.2 Appendix: Measurement error
In the light of our imputation procedure, let’s assume that both consumption and income are measured with






where x¤ denote a measured variable, x its true, unobservable value, and u the measurement error. Equations
(17) and (18) then rewrite as:
∆y¤




i;a;t » = Áb;t³i;a;t + Ãb;t®a"i;a;t + ∆uc
i;a;t (25)
Consider ﬁrst the case L ¡ a ! 1, r ! 0, and ®a ! 0. Assume that measurement error in income is


























































25Quasi-classical in the sense that the variance of the measurement error is not (necessarily) constant over
time.






cannot be told apart, and Ãb;t thus remains unidentiﬁed. If L ¡ a
























separately identiﬁed and Ãb;t remains unidentiﬁed. It is possible however to put an upper bound on Ãb;t















Thus it is possible to argue that the estimate of Ãb;t is upward biased due to measurement error in
income.
A.3 Appendix: The imputation procedure
Consider the demand equation for food at home (23) in the CEX:
fi;CEX = M0
i;CEX¹ + ¯ci;CEX + ei;CEX















To understand under which conditions moments of imputed PSID consumption mirror those of “true”











b ¯ . Consider for simplicity the univariate regression case:
b ci;CEX =






and deﬁne with x =
PN
i=1 xi
N and var(x) =
PN
i=1(xi¡x)2
N the sample cross-sectional mean and variance of
the variable x. Let us consider two cases of interest.
The ﬁrst case is when ci;CEX is measured without error. In this case, plim b ¯ = ¯ and plim b ¹ = ¹. It
follows that:
3plim b cCEX = plim c
and:
plim var(b cCEX) = plim var(c) +
1
¯2plim var(e)
Thus the sample mean of predicted CEX consumption converges to the same limit of the sample mean
of true consumption, while the sample variance of predicted CEX consumption converges to the limit of the
variance of true consumption up to an additive term. The latter decreases with the value of the expenditure
elasticity. If the demand for food at home is relatively inelastic (¯ ! 0) the additive term may be potentially
quite large.
As for PSID imputed consumption, it is easy to prove that:




plim fPSID ¡ plim fCEX
¤
and:







2 [plim var(fPSID) ¡ plim var(fCEX)] (29)
Thus the sample mean of imputed PSID consumption converges to the limit of the sample mean of true
consumption up to an additive term (the mean diﬀerence in the input variable available in both surveys, e.g.,
food consumption). If food consumption is on average the same in the two data sets, the sample mean of
imputed PSID consumption converges to the same limit of the sample mean of true consumption. Otherwise,
the sample mean of imputed PSID consumption may overestimates or underestimate the sample mean of
true consumption.
Note also that the sample variance of imputed PSID consumption diﬀers from the variance of true
consumption because of two factors: the variance of food heterogeneity scaled by the square of the income
elasticity and the diﬀerence between the variance of food consumption in the two data sets, again scaled by
the square of the income elasticity.26 Our minimum distance procedure is designed to estimate this factor
using, e.g., (27).
In the second case, ci;CEX is measured with classical error: c¤ = c + v. It follows that plim b ¯ =
¯
¸ and
plim b ¹ = ¹ + ¯
(¸¡1)
¸ plim c, where ¸ =
plim var(c¤)
plim var(c) ¸ 1. Repeating the same steps above:
plim b cCEX = plim c = plim c¤
26It also follows that the variances of ﬁrst diﬀerences var(∆b cCEX) will exceed var(∆c) by the term
var(∆e)
¯2 ,






2 [plim var(∆fPSID) ¡ plim var(∆fCEX)]:
4and:












As for PSID imputed consumption,




plim fPSID ¡ plim fCEX
¤
































[plim var(fPSID) ¡ plim var(fCEX)] (31)
In general, the presence of classical measurement error makes the discrepancy between moments of
imputed consumption and moments of true consumption worse than in the case where c is measured without
error.
This discussion suggests the use of an instrumental variable procedure in the attempt of minimizing the
impact of biases in the estimated coeﬃcients ¯ and ¹ (see Table 4 for the results).
Table 3 shows that our imputed PSID consumption overestimates CEX consumption by about 25 percent
in the initial year. The amount of overestimation declines somewhat in the following years. The fact that
imputed consumption in the PSID is on average higher than raw consumption in the CEX may have various
explanations. First, despite our focus on homogeneous samples, the demographic characteristics in the PSID
may still be quite diﬀerent than those in the PSID (see Table 3). The second possibility is that the input
variable (food expenditure) is measured diﬀerently in the two data sets, and measurement of this variable
may have changed over time. This is in fact the case in the CEX, as we noticed in the main text. Finally,
our IV procedure may not eliminate the bias in the parameters of the demand equation due to measurement
error in non-durable expenditure. In this case, overestimation is expected.
Despite these diﬀerence, it is worth noting that while the matching of mean consumption is desirable,
it is not necessary, in that the scope of the empirical analysis is to estimate models for the variance of
consumption and its covariance with income.
To see whether measurement error is an issue in our imputations procedure, we ﬁnally compute the
slope of the relationship between var(b cPSID) and var(c¤
CEX) in two cases: OLS and IV. The OLS slope
is 1.15, the IV is 0.99.27 The OLS intercept is also larger than the IV intercept. These ﬁndings are indeed












5predictable by the analysis above. To see this point, recall that equation (31) and (29) refer to the OLS and
IV case, respectively, if consumption in the CEX is measured with classical error and a valid instrument is
available. From the comparison of these two equations two things can be noticed. First, the slope of the
relationship between var(b cPSID) and var(c¤
CEX) is unity in the IV case and greater than one in the OLS
(biased) case. Second, the intercept of the relationship is greater in the OLS case than in the IV case. Both
predictions appear to be supported.
While this evidence can only be taken as suggestive, it provides some useful information. First, an
IV adjustment seems warranted. Second, once the adjustment is made, the moments of imputed PSID
consumption mirror closely those of “true” consumption (see Figure 1).
A.4 Appendix: Estimation details






















where, for simplicity, we indicate with 0 the ﬁrst year in the panel (1978) and with T the last (1992), and














where di;t = 1fyi;t, ci;t are not missingg. This means that only complete observations on these two vari-
ables are used. This notation allows us to handle the problem of unbalanced panel data in a simple manner.


















where ® denotes an elementwise division. The vector m contains the estimates of cov (∆yt;∆yt+s),
cov (∆yt;∆ct+s), and cov (∆ct;∆ct+s), a total of T (2T + 1) unique moments). To obtain the variance-


























and ~ denotes an elementwise product. The square roots of the elements
in the main diagonal of V provide the standard errors of the corresponding elements in m.
What we do in the empirical analysis is to estimate models for m:
m = f (Λ) + Υ
where Υ captures sampling variability and Λ is the vector of parameters we are interested in (the variances
of the permanent shock and the transitory shock, the partial insurance parameters, etc.). For instance the
































We solve the problem of estimating Λ by minimizing:
min
Λ
(m ¡ f (Λ))
0 A(m ¡ f (Λ))
where A is a weighting matrix. Optimal minimum distance (OMD) imposes A = V¡1, equally weighted
minimum distance (EWMD) imposes A = I, and variance-weighted minimum distance (VWMD) requires




For inference purposes we require the computation of standard errors. Chamberlain (1984) shows that

















Λ=b Λ is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the estimated parameters b Λ. The validity of













in the OMD case. See Chamberlain (1984) for more details. Under the null hypothesis that the model is
valid, the test statistic J is distributed Â2 with degrees of freedom equal to [T (2T + 1) ¡ rank(G)]. This
test statistics is reported at the bottom of Tables 10 and 11.
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